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Introduction 
By Olav Njl!llstad 
The sabotage action against Norsk Hydro's heavy 
water factory at Vemork, Rjukan, in February 1943 
was undoubtedly one of the most astonishing and 
heroic Norwegian-Allied operations in Norway 
during the Second World War. Its blend of high 
politics, scientific adventure, military drama and 
individual courage has intrigued people for more 
than fifty years. Numerous accounts of the event 
have been made, including two commercial films, 
and in Norsk Industriarbeidermuseum (the Norwe-
gian Industrial Workers Museum) at Rjukan there 
is now a permanent exhibition of related sabotage 
memorabilia. On each anniversary hundreds of 
people still gather atVemork to participate in the 
«Saboteur March», which basically takes the same 
route down the mountains to the Norsk Hydro 
plant as the saboteurs did in 1943. 
However, the fact that the memory of this 
remarkable sabotage action is so well preserved 
and observed does not mean that there is nothing 
left to say about it - or, for that matter, about the 
other Allied military operations against Vemork 
and the stocks of heavy water which the Germans 
kept there. This can be seen from the three papers 
presented in this study which, each in its own way, 
add substantially to our understanding of the 
wartime race for the Norwegian heavy water. 
In the first paper, Professor Ole Kristian 
Grimnes explains why heavy water was produced 
in such exceptional quantities at Rjukan in the first 
place, and also sheds illuminating light on the 
fundamental question of how significant the 
sabotage operations at Vemork were for the 
German nuclear weapons programme and the 
Allied war effort. His balanced conclusion is that 
whereas the German effort was not critically 
influenced by the events in Norway, the operations 
were nevertheless of crucial importance to the 
Western powers because they helped eliminate 
whatever uncertainty there still was about German 
ambitions in the nuclear field and they thus re-
lieved for good the Anglo-American fears of a 
German atomic bomb. Finally, Grimnes points out 
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that the Norwegian-Allied heavy water operations 
"may be considered the first attempt to secure the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by military 
action", and he discusses what kind oflegacy they 
represent in that respect. 
In the second paper, Joachim RIilnneberg, who 
at the age of22 led the sabotage action in February 
1943, shares with us his memories of that dramatic 
event. In addition to the many fascinating details 
about how the sabotage was planned and executed, 
the reader will find some very valuable reflections 
on why that particular operation became such a 
huge success. Here, RIilnneberg - who has always 
been very modest about his own role in the affair -
plays down the individual qualities of the sabo-
teurs, stressing instead how the Gunnerside group 
benefitted from exceptionally good intelligence 
and strong Allied support. The reader, however, 
cannot fail to see that the operation must also have 
been helped tremendously by the personal courage, 
physical fitness and superior tactical dispositions of 
RIilnneberg and his men. To be sure, this was fully 
acknowledged at the time: the members of the 
Gunnerside Operation became the most decorated 
sabotage group in Norwegian history, and even the 
leader of the German forces in Norway, General 
von Falkenhorst, described their action as "the 
most remarkable coup I have ever seen in this 
war". 
While the story of the German-Allied struggle 
for the Norwegian heavy water is well known to 
most Norwegians, they are less familiar with the 
intra-Allied aspects of the race. In the third paper, 
some of these are exposed by Dr Bertrand 
Goldschmidt, the former General-Director of the 
French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat 
a l'Energie Atomique). A prominent physicist 
himself, Goldschmidt gives a wonderfully concise 
account of the scientific developments that led to 
the V.S. decision il) October 1941 to launch a crash 
programme to build, if possible, a military weapon 
based on nuclear fission. But the main purpose of 
his paper is to show that without their privileged 
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access to Norwegian heavy water, which was 
obtained by France through secret negotiations 
with Norsk Hydro in March 1940 and with the 
Norwegian government in exile in March 1945, 
Goldschmidt and his colleagues in the CEA would 
have had great difficulty in fulfilling the goals of 
the French atomic energy programme. 
In Goldschmidt's judgement, the prewar 
supplies of 185 kilos Norwegian heavy water to 
France served as «the entrance tickeb> to the Allied 
nuclear enterprise, which eventually provided 
French scientists with invaluable know-how about 
the plutonium extraction process in a heavy water 
reactor. Then, in the late 1940s, the delivery of7 
tons Norwegian heavy water was "indispensable" 
for the increasingly successful French effort to 
build a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor. 
According to Goldschmidt, without these early 
achievements it is doubtful whether the advocates 
of a national French nuclear weapons programme 
could have defeated their opponents in time to 
obtain their ultimate goal. 
The Norwegian willinguess in the 1940s and 
1950s to assist France in her military-related 
nuclear effort shows that nuclear non-proliferation 
had still to become the guiding principle for 
Norway's export of heavy water. (Instead, Norwe-
gian policy appears to have been restriCted, prima-
rily by a secret export control agreement with the 
USA, which ensured that items used in the produc-
tion of nuclear energy were not to be exported to 
the Communist bloc countries.) Because of the 
extreme secretiveness that still surrounds some of 
the large-quantity sales of Norwegian heavy water, 
historians are left in the dark about when, and for 
what reason, the initial export policy was changed, 
and how strictly the new rules were adhered to 
afterwards. Hopefully, the day is approaching 
when scholars will be allowed to address these 
questions with the same unrestricted access to 
primary sources as they now enjoy in their research 
on the time period covered by the present study. 
Only then will it be possible to make a fair and 
comprehensive historical aSsessment of the Norwe-
gian heavy water's impact on the nuclear energy 
programmes of nations other than Nazi Germany 
and France. 
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The Allied heavy water operations at Rjukan* 
By Ole Kristian Grimnes 
The Allied heavy water operations at Rjukan 
during World War 11 are certainly worth a study in 
themselves. The sources for such a study are 
abundant. Here I am not concerned with a detailed 
examination of these operations, however. Rather, 
my interest is how to put them in a broader per-
spective. They certainly ought to be viewed within 
a wider framework, too. 
Let us address questions like these: Was heavy 
water so important? If it was, why in the whole 
wide world was it produced only at Vemork near 
the town of Rjukan in any appreciable quantity? 
And even more to the point, in what way did the 
. Allied heavy water operations affect the German 
nuclear programme during the war? Surely, these 
are essential questions which could receive only a 
very partial answer during the war. Today we 
know most of the relevant facts and are in a better 
position to evaluate them objectively. 
But first let us very briefly review the heavy 
water operations at Rjukan during the war. There 
were four of them, and they were carried out 
within a period of little more than a year, from 
autumn 1942 to the beginning of February 1944. 
The first action was a glider operation. On 19 
November 1942 two Halifax aircraflleft Scotland, 
each towing a glider. The gliders carried 34 British 
soldiers and were supposed to land on some marshes 
about 15 miles west ofRjukan. There they would be 
received by a Norwegian advance party that had 
parachuted into Norway a month before. They would 
guide the British to the heavy water plant at Vemork 
which they were to blow up, if possible also the 
power plant. The operation proved a complete 
disaster. Only one of the Halifax aircrafl returned 
safely to Scotland. Due to bad weather the other 
crashed as did both the gliders. 41 soldiers and 
airmen were either killed in the crash or by the 
Gennans after they had been taken prisoner. 
• A paper presented at the International Conference 
on Nuclear Technology and Politics. ~ukl1n. 16-
18 June 1993. 
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The second operation was a sabotage action on 
28 February 1943, carried out against the heavy 
water plant at Vemork by a party of nine Norwe-
gian soldiers. They descended from the mountains, 
crossed the valley, and reached the high concentra-
tion plant for heavy water which they blew up 
before returning to the mountain plateau of 
Hardangervidda. They destroyed the plant for a 
period of one and a haIfto two months, and 
stopped production of heavy water for five 
months. 
The third operation was an American bombing 
attack on 16 November 1943.173 B-17 and B-24 
bombing machines swept over the Rjukan valley 
and dropped their bombs at Vemork and also 
further down the valley at Rjukan. The bombs 
inflicted severe damage on the factory, the power 
station and the pipelines but the high concentration 
plant for heavy water in the cellar of the factory 
was hardly touched. Still, after this operation the 
Germans decided to halt the production at Vemork 
completely and send their stocks of diluted heavy 
water to Germany to have it concentrated there. The 
attack took its toll in human lives. 21 Norwegians 
were killed during the attack. 
The fourth and last operation was again a 
sabotage action, carried out by three Norwegian 
saboteurs on 20 February 1944. It was an action 
against different concentrations of heavy water 
under transportation from Rjukan, destination 
Germany. The ferry which carried the precious 
cargo on lake Tinnsjll east of Rjukan was blown up 
and most of the heavy water went to the bottom of 
the lake. Again there were losses in human lives. 
14 Norwegians and four German soldiers were 
killed as a result of this action. Later in the year the 
Germans dismantled the heavy water apparatus and 
dispatched it to Germany. 
Let us then address the questions related to an 
overall assessment of the heavy water operations . 
First, was heavy water really so important and if so 
why? It was. I am no scientist and shall certainly 
not attempt to act as one. But this much seems 
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clear even to a layman in these matters. Nuclear 
research during the war was largely a question of 
fissioning uranium and of turning a first fission 
into a self-sustaining chain reaction. Such a chain 
reaction requires a moderator to be effective. A 
moderator is a substance which slows up the 
extreme speed of the neutrons which are liberated 
in a chain reaction and which are needed to main-
tain it. Only if the neutrons are thus moderated 
wiII they operate effectively in the process. 
Heavy water was considered the best modera-
tor. True, the Americans did not use it in their 
atomic bomb project, they used pure graphite. But 
that was because they had no heavy water at the 
outset and only started a modest production of it at 
a later date. The Germans, however, did have 
access to heavy water since it was produced in 
occupied Norway so they settled for heavy water 
as their moderator. Through this decision heavy 
water became indispensable to German nuclear 
research. 
Another question is why heavy water was 
manufactured in any significant quantity only at 
VemorkIRjukan of all places, in this wild ravine in 
the very heart of mountainous southern Norway. 
There is a basic answer to that question and one 
which provides a clue to another question at the 
same time: Why is there any industry at all in this 
inaccessible part of Norway which used to be a 
godforsaken valley in its time, before the turn of 
the century? Even the sun disappears for several 
months during the winter at the bottom of this grim 
gorge, the high mountains blocking its rays from 
entering. 
Cheap hydroelectric power is the basic answer, 
cheaper than in any other part of Europe. Cheap 
not so much because there are high falls and rapid 
streams in Norway - the European Alps also boast 
those - but cheap because the Norwegian moun-
tains in addition hold huge lakes and water reser-
voirs which can be regulated to guarantee a steady 
water supply. Vast regions are largely uninhabited 
and so the construction of dams, the flooding of 
fields, and the channelling of streams and water-
falls into tunnels and pipelines until recently did 
not draw much political opposition from those 
affected by such works. Nor did hydroelectric 
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development projects run up soaring biIls of 
indemnification because the proprietors must be 
compensated at a high cost. 
A new industry, founded on electricity-consum-
ing technology and inexpensive hydroelectric 
energy was therefore developed here and in other 
parts of Norway from around the turn of the 
century. It was a development which added a 
distinct feature to the Norwegian industrial land-
scape. In fact, it constituted a very characteristic 
second industrial revolution in this country which 
like many other European countries outside Eng-
land had started its industrial revolution around the 
middle of the 19th century. 
One particular company initiated this develop-
ment at Rjukan and has dominated it ever since, 
Norsk Hydro - or Hydro for short. Hydro was 
founded on a Norwegian invention, the fixation of 
the atmosphere's nitrugen through the use of an 
electric arch. In the late 1920s the company had to 
give up that technology and switch to the German 
Haber-Bosch method for the same purpose, the 
fixation of nitrogen. This method required hydro-
gen which in Germany was obtained from coal or 
coke of which Germany has ample supplies. 
Norway had and has very little coal. In this country 
it was better to extract hydrogen from water by 
means of electrolysis - that is by sending an 
electric current through water so that the hydrogen 
and the oxygen in the water were separated. By 
1929 Hydro had built the world's largest plant for 
the electrolytic separation of water at Vemork. 
At that time heavy water was still unknown. 
But in 1934 the American chemist Harold Urey 
was awarded the Nobel prize for his recent discov-
ery of heavy water. This kind of water is very 
much like ordinary water and ordinary water 
contains a tiny bit of heavy water. So tiny in fact 
that one ton of ordinary water contains no more 
than 150 grams of heavy water. In other words, 
you have to have a lot of ordinary water if you 
want to extract significant amounts of heavy water 
from it. Such extraction is possible through 
electrolysis. In fact, heavy water could be sepa-
rated from ordinary water as a byproduct of the 
electrolysis of water which Hydro was already 
engaged in. 
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In 1934, therefore, Hydro started a modest 
commercial production of heavy water. A small 
plant for the high concentration of heavy water was 
placed in the cellar of the large electrolytic factory. 
At that time scientists still did not know how to 
fission uranium atoms so that heavy water had not 
yet acquired its sinister significance. It was used 
·for scientific purposes and was believed to have its 
greatest potential in biochemistry. 
To sum up, Hydro and only Hydro produced 
heavy water at Vemork in industrial quantities 
before the war because there is only a small 
amount of heavy water in each ton of ordinary 
water, because this small amount could be obtained 
as a byproduct of electrolysis, because only a huge 
electrolytic plant could produce a significant 
amount of heavy water, and because Hydro and 
only Hydro had such a plant, the world's largest, 
owing to the company's access to Europe's cheap-
est hydroelectric power. The plant was situated 
very close to the power station at Vemork. That 
station is still standing and is today a museum. The 
old electrolytic plant, however, with its high 
concentration installation in the cellar has been 
pulled down. 
Heavy water was crucial to German nuclear 
research. One would think, then, that the Allied 
heavy water operations - to the extent that they 
were successful - would be just as crucial in their 
detrimental effect on German nuclear research. But 
things were not that simple. Paradoxically, the 
Allied heavy water operations had only a modest 
effect on the German nuclear programme even 
though heavy water was indispensable to it. The 
Germans were never able to produce an atomic 
bomb. But that fact can in no way be attributed to 
the Allied heavy water operations. These opera-
tions did, however, affect the German non-bomb 
nuclear research. 
This was not because the Allied heavy water 
operations did not enjoy considerable success. 
They did. True, the Germans did obtain heavy 
water from Vemork. They got it before the Allied 
operations started and they still got some after the 
first operations had been carried out until the 
production was completely halted in late 1943. 
Jomar Brun, who is certainly more qualified than I 
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am to handle the technical aspects of the matter, 
has calculated that the Germans received only 2.5 
tons of heavy water from Vemork instead of twice 
that amount, which they might have received had 
there been no Allied operations.' But that is not 
the main point. The German nuclear programme 
was only moderately influenced by the availability 
or non-availability of heavy water. Quite other and 
more important factors were at work. 
The story of German nuclear research during 
the war is by now well known and I can only touch 
upon it here in the brief est of outlines. It was only 
about or just before the beginning of the Second 
World War that scientists in several countries had 
come to the conclusion that uranium could be 
fissioned and that a chain reaction might be initi-
ated on the basis of such a fission. Experiments 
with a chain reaction could, however, aim in two 
rather different directions. They might generate 
energy which could be utilized for different 
purposes, including civilian ones. But the experi-
ments might also produce a big explosion, an 
atomic bomb. Thus, in principle, the scientific 
groundwork for the development of a bomb was 
laid about the beginning of the war. This was 
known by scientists on both the German and Allied 
sides. And on both sides the scientific premises for 
a nuclear project were elaborated over the next two 
years. In this work the Germans were most prob-
ably abead of the Allies. 
But in the course of 1942 their ways parted. 
The Americans made a tremendous technical and 
industrial effort to put the purely scientific princi-
ples into operation and produce a bomb. As we all 
know, they succeeded only at the end of the war, in 
the summer of 1945. The Germans, on the other 
hand, gave up trying to make a bomb and confined 
themselves to the development of a uranium burner 
which might be installed in German submarines 
and provide energy for their operation. 
There has been much debate on why the 
Germans accorded such a low priority to their 
nuclear research and why they, by the autumn of 
1942, had discarded any thought of making a 
bomb. The main reason seems to be that the 
German scientists did not believe they could 
develop any bomb before the end of the war. It 
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would therefore be a waste of valuable resources, 
much needed elsewhere for the German war effort, 
to give top priority to a bomb project. This pessi-
mism implanted itself in 1942 to German political 
and military authorities who consequently did not 
feel any impulsion to push an atomic bomb project. 
In his memoirs Albert Speer, the Minister of 
Armaments, writes: "On the suggestion of the 
nuclear physicists we scuttled the project to de-
velop an atomic bomb by the autumn of 1942, after 
I had again ·queried them about deadlines and been 
told that we could not count on anything for three 
or four years. The war would certainly have been 
decided long before then.'" 
Even if the Germans had given first priority to 
the bomb and concentrated all their resources on it, 
it is very doubtful whether they would have been 
able to manufacture a bomb before the end of the 
war. Even the Americans with their enormous 
resources and the top priority which they accorded 
to developing a bomb had no bomb ready until July 
1945. 
Against this background it becomes clear that 
the presence or absence of Norwegian heavy water 
played no role for the German decision to refrain 
from trying to make a bomb. By the autumn of 
1942, prior to any Allied opemtion against 
Vemork, the Germans had already given up the 
bomb. On the other hand, the Allied heavy water 
opemtions most likely did play a role in the more 
modest German project which aimed at developing 
an energy-producing uranium machine. There was 
even a danger that the Germans might use a 
successful uranium reactor to manufacture radioac-
tive material and employ it as poison gas in their 
warfare. But the Germans never reached the point 
where they were able to produce a self-sustaining 
chain reaction. Plausibly, shortage of heavy water 
was one cause for this failure. Others were the 
generally low priority that the Germans gave to 
their nuclear research and the Allied bombing of 
Germany where the nuclear experiments were 
carried out. 
I remember vividly a young interviewer's 
worried face when he questioned me on a TV 
programme earlier this year and I stressed - as I 
have done here - that, on the one hand, the Allied 
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heavy water opemtions were a considemble 
success and that, on the other, they nonetheless had 
only a limited significance for the German nuclear 
programme during the war. Possibly, the young 
man was troubled by the question whether all the 
lives lost in the Allied opemtions were really worth 
the effort when they had such a limited effect. But 
I really think that the strained look he gave me 
revealed something else. He probably felt uncon-
sciously that a national myth was being threatened, 
that the heroic heavy water sabotage about which 
all Norwegians have heard so much and on which 
they pride themselves, was in danger of being 
exposed. 
I do not think it is. The s~a of the heavy water 
sabotage loses none of its thrill, the saboteurs none 
oftheir valour, the action none of its audacity of 
design even if hindsight puts the actions in a 
different perspective from that which prevailed 
during the war. War is a hidden game, which only 
a postwar period lays bare. The struggle for heavy 
water was fought on the assumptions ofthe war 
and becomes no less successful and no less gallant 
on those premises even if we today know more 
about all those other factors that were at work but 
which were hidden from the Allies at the time. 
But this certainly calls for another question. 
How much did the Allies know about German 
nuclear research during the war? What were the 
assumptions on which they acted when they 
decided to take the risks and disregard the possible 
losses which the struggle for heavy water might 
entail? 
The Allies knew very little about German 
nuclear research in the beginning. What they did 
know was that the Germans shared the common 
knowledge among physicists that a nuclear bomb 
was feasible in principle though still far ahead in 
terms of technical and industrial execution. In-
deed, the German scientists themselves had made 
important contributions to that knowledge. But 
Allied intelligence knew next to nothing about how 
far the Germans had advanced in their nuclear 
research and how hard they pushed it. 
The Allies were, however, increasingly wor-
ried, not because they knew anything specific 
about the Germans but because they knew how 
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their own nuclear research was advancing, aiming 
precisely at a bomb. Might not the Germans do the 
same thing, was there not a nuclear race going on? 
From the beginning of 1942 special efforts were 
made to improve the supply of intelligence on 
German nuclear research. It was a difficult task. By 
May 1942 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) - the organi-
sation responsible for carrying out subversive 
action in occupied countries - had succeeded only 
in confirming in general terms that the Germans 
remained active. 
One factor which contributed to the Allied 
anxiety was their knowledge that the Germans 
were taking steps to increase production of heavy 
water at Vemork. The Secret Intelligence Service 
might not know much about the actual nuclear 
research going on in Germany. But it was well 
informed about the developments at Vemork. One 
of those who knew most about the heavy water 
installation, Professor Leif Tronstad, had partici-
pated in the resistance but had to escape and came 
to England in the autumn of1941. He cooperated 
intimately with British intelligence and operative 
organs. Contact was also established clandestinely 
with key persons in Hydro and at Vemork. Signs of 
increased German interest in heavy water certainly 
worried the Allies. Such interest could hardly be 
explained by anything but German concern with 
nuclear research even though it could not reveal 
the more specific nature of that research. 
It was on these general grounds that the British, 
still lacking firm intelligence about the German 
programme, decided in April/May 1942 that they 
would attempt to halt the production of heavy 
water at Vemork. In other words, the first heavy 
water operations were carried out because the 
Allies wanted to eliminate a vital link in German 
nuclear research about which they knew very little 
in more specific terms. Certainly, the Allies did not 
know whether they were trying to deny the heavy 
water to a bomb project or some more modest 
nuclear endeavour. 
From spring 1943 on the basis ofintelligence 
from different sources, including Norwegian and 
German ones, the Allies became more assured 
regarding German nuclear research. The British 
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were coming to believe that the Germans now 
thought they could not produce an atomic weapon 
in time for use in the war and that the Germans did 
not give priority to their nuclear research pro-
gramme. Still, other reports made it clear to the 
Allies that the Germans continued to carry out 
nuclear research. As late as November 1944 an 
analysis of these reports said that "it is extremely 
difficult to form a definite opinion as to the ur-
gency and purpose of this work". 3 
It seems then that the later heavy water opera-
tions were carried out at a time when the Allies - or 
the British at least - were less worried about the 
German nuclear research than before. But they 
were still determined to put a stop to the German 
heavy water production in Norway. Evidently, they 
did not want to take any risks. The Germans might 
possibly be more ambitious in their research than 
the intelligence reports indicated or they might 
make a sudden leap forward in their nuclear 
experiments. Better then to deny the Germans any 
access to heavy water. 
The four Allied or AlliedINorwegian heavy 
water operations, taken together, may be consid-
ered the first attempt to secure the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons by military action. Such action 
is certainly not what one would wish for regarding 
non-proliferation which should rather be promoted 
through negotiations and agreements freely entered 
into. But should military action be deemed essen-
tial I wish it could be inspired by the first "counter-
proliferation" action which took place at Vemork. 
It is my favourite, I must admit, of the four heavy 
water operations. A handful of men slipping down 
from the mountains, then vanishing into their 
blizzards and fog again, executed what could only 
be called a surgical operation. An attack which hit 
precisely at its target, destroying heavy water 
equipment whereas no human lives were lost 
neither, on the Norwegian or Allied side, nor on 
the German. Let us hope there will be no need for 
military non-proliferation actions. But should they 
be necessary let them be as surgical and with as 
little loss of human life as the Vemork heavy water 
sabotage of28 February 1943. 
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J Jomar Brun, Brennpunkt Vemork 1940-1945, 
Oslo 1985, p. 97. 
, Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 318. 
3 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second 
World War, volII, p. 128. 
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Operation "Gunnerside": Reminiscences of a 
heavy water saboteur* 
By Joachim Renneberg 
At the end of November 1942, I was in Aviemore 
in Scotland responsible for instruction and sabo-
tage and the use of explosives in our unit, when I 
was called up to our commanding officer. He said 
he had a signal from London asking if! would lead 
an expedition to Norway. Of course I was very 
glad to be offered this opportunity. He told me that 
I had to select five men for the job. 
I asked him, "Are we going in by boat, or are 
we going in by plane? Do we need to be good at 
skiing? Is there any advice you can give me in my 
choice of men?" 
He said he did not know, I would have to go 
down to London. When I got there, I met Major Leif 
Tronstad, who was our commanding officer at the 
time. Tronstad, who was a chemistry professor, had 
advised Norsk Hydro on building the heavy water 
factory at Vemork. He told me that it was our task to 
destroy it He also informed me that a Norwegian 
soldier had been sent there early in the spring of 1942 
to provide information for London. Moreover, four 
men from our unit had already been sent to 
Hardangervidda in October to prepare for landing 34 
. British commandos. They had landing equipment for 
the gliders that were to carry them. I suppose it was 
the first time the Eureka radio system was used on 
the continent for landing a sabotage group. Unfortu-
nately, the chaps down on the ground heard the 
aeroplane and had it on the Eureka, but the plane 
turned back. It received no signal from the ground. 
That was a tremendous blow to the chaps who stayed 
there, as they had sutrered quite a lot since they 
arrived in Norway. They got orders to stay on 
because London was planning another operation. My 
party was going to be sent in and we were to join 
forces with the Swallow group so there would be 
nine or ten of us carrying out the attack. 
-Based on an oral presentation at the International 
Conference on Nuclear Technology and Politics. 
Rjulwn. 16 - 18 June 1993. 
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Tronstad told me that we should be ready by the 
December moon. That gave us just over a fortoight 
to plan our equipment, plan our trip to Sweden, and 
get acquainted with the target and the explosives. 
And we were very short of time. It was not like the 
present time, when you can go into any shop and 
say that you want to buy a sleeping bag to with-
stand 30 degrees C of frost, or any other items for a 
winter expedition. Sleeping bags were one of the 
difficult problems to solve. I ended up in a bedding 
equipment store in London. Down in the factory by 
the docks, I met a very good man who was willing 
to try to sew the first sleeping bag on my instruc-
tions. We made a few alterations, and he then made 
six sleeping bags. He made more bags for other 
operations later in the war. 
We decided to take weapons that would give us 
the strongest possible hit on the spot. Hence we 
chose the tommy gun and the Colt 45. Both weap-
ons used the same type of ammunition. We also 
went to the Norwegian Intelligence Office, saying 
that we wanted a map of southern Norway, mark-
ing the places where German soldiers were sta-
tioned. We ended up by planning our route from 
Vemork - Dagali - Svenkerud - Nord-Aurdal-
Svatsum - Losna - Rena - Flisa and ordered de-
tailed maps (1:100,000) to cover the retreat route to 
Sweden, altogether some 600 kilometres. 
Major Tronstad showed me a photo of our 
target. I had never been to Vemork before, and it 
was an impressive target, I must say. The photo 
showed the gorge and the suspension bridge, and 
the road leading up to the factory area. The plant 
itself was a huge building - 25 x 100 metres - seven 
stories high (35 metres) concrete. Our target, the 
heavy water factory, was down in the cellar. 
The assault had to be done in wintertime. The 
original plan was to strike on Christmas Eve, but 
there was no chance of flying at the time of the full 
moon in December. We flew over in January, but 
were unable to make contact with the reception 
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committee. So we returned to England, a great 
setback for us and for them. 
The radio station they had opened up in Octo-
ber was sending information to London about 
everything the Germans did in this area. It was one 
of the longest-serving radio stations in Norway. 
The group got maps covering the whole route to 
Sweden. In case we got separated, each of us had a 
map of southern Norway and a compass so that we 
could take our bearings between the valleys for a 
possible retreat. 
We were dropped on 17 February 1943. At first 
we thought that we had been dropped on the right 
spot, and we made our depots and put down poles 
for finding the depots when we returned. However, 
we soon discovered that we were 25 kilometres 
away from where we should have landed, and 
things looked very difficult. Then we were delayed 
five nights because of heavy snow storms. 
When we finally met the Swallow group, we 
started planning the operation. I must say I do not 
think that any group sent into Europe was supplied 
with such good intelligence. I could sit there with a 
blank piece of paper and draw a map of the area, 
including the roads and buildings and tell them that 
according to the latest reports which they had 
brought up from the valley, from our local contacts 
at Norsk Hydro, there was a German barracks at 
the plant containing some 20 soldiers. Moreover, 
the Germans had a double guard down on the 
bridge. There were also a gate in the middle of the 
bridge and a sentry box with a button to set off the 
alarm to the guards at the factory. Everything was 
fenced in, there were mines all along the water 
pipeline, except for the entrance to the railway 
which was on the southern side of the valley. 
We were planning to go down the slopes from 
the mountains between Vemork and Rjukan. But 
the local guides said that there was too much snow 
and the slope was too steep. We said that we 
planned to cross the gorge, and they told us that 
that was not.possible. Their solution was to mingle 
with the shiftworkers when they came up at 10 
p.m. and get rid of the sentries down on the sus-
pension bridge. 
We said "Well, we will have to try the gorge, 
because if we have 20 Norwegians as onlookers 
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when we kill the Germans down here, they will be 
shot the next morning". 
The reason we were in uniform was to prevent 
reprisals. 
When we were in our advance position for the 
attack, we sent one of the chaps down to reconnoi-
tre a possible crossing a bit further down the river. 
We knew from a photo that the terrain looked a bit 
easier to traverse at one spot, and a couple of 
hundred yards further up the river it looked even 
better, and then we could climb up on the railway 
line. When he came back four hours later, we knew 
that it was quite possible to cross the river. In the 
beginning we felt that we had an 80 per cent 
chance of success. We did not think very much 
about retreat then. But when we saw that we could 
cross the river without crossing at the bridge, we 
immediately increased our odds to 90-95 per cent. 
We came down through the woods - our route 
was very, very steep, with lots of snow - and onto 
the road. To avoid some workers' buildings, we 
decided to go straight out into the valley, which 
meant a lot of climbing. I remember at one point, 
the bus with the shiftworkers passed by. Two of 
my men who were hiding above the road, waiting 
for the bus to pass, nearly fell down onto the roof 
of the bus. But it turned out all right. 
We left our equipment near the road leading 
down to Rjukan, and had only the explosives and 
the weapons with us when we crossed the river. At 
about 11.30 p.m. we were sitting just outside the 
fence, watching the changing of the guard down on 
the bridge. We saw them pass by, and waited until 
they entered the barracks, and then we thought, as 
it was just over midnight, 'This is it'. We cut the 
barbed wire, and the fence - or the padlock - and 
went inside. The covering party went into position 
in a haIf-circle around the barracks and once they 
were in position the Germans could not do any-
thing, no matter what happened. We who were in 
the demolition party climbed down and opened 
another gate and went into the building over the 
cellar. At first we had difficulties, but in the end we 
found a cable tunnel, up underneath the roof, 
which was five metres high. 
As mentioned, the main building was 25 by 100 
metres in seven stories. The production started in 
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the top storey and continued in circles until it 
ended as heavy water down in the bottom. And that 
was our target: a battery of 18 cells, the last stage 
in the production. Two of us managed to get in and 
we started laying the charges. The order was that if 
anything happened that could endanger the result, 
you had to act on your own. The three other chaps 
in the demolition party, one of them carrying a set 
of charges, decided to break the window to get 
inside because they did not know that we were 
busy inside. When the window broke, both goups 
were equally surprised. 
I helped one of my friends to get in, and we 
finished laying the charges. They were not big 
charges. They weighed about 4.5 kilos, and had 
been chained up by the British before we left. 
Two-minute fuses, four of them. There was a 
Norwegian workman inside the factory reading the 
instruments and filling out the logbook. He heard 
us talking Norwegian, discussing whether we 
should put on a 30-second fuse just to be sure that 
we heard the bang as soon as possible. That was 
when he asked for his glasses. It was difficult to 
get glasses in Norway, so he wanted to have them 
before we lit the charges. I remember I threw away 
what I was doing and searched for the glasses and 
found the case and handed it to him. He was very 
pleased and I started getting the ignition sets ready 
when he suddenly said that the glasses were not in 
the case. 
I said "Where the hell are they then?" 
And he said "Well, they were there when you 
came in." In the end I found them being used as a 
bookmark in his logbook, and gave them to him. 
Then we ordered him to give us the key for the 
cellar door so that we could go out through the 
door like other human beings. We opened the door 
and I remember Major Tronstad saying that in case 
we needed to lock up the guard, the key for the 
lavatory was on the left-hand side of the door. I 
remember just after we had lit these 30-second 
fuses, I saw the key, but we did not need it. 
We said to the man, "You just run around the 
corner, up the staircase, lie down and keep your 
mouth open, until you hear the bang. There will be 
only one bang, so when it is over you can go down 
and watch the result". I do not know ifhe did. But 
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I know that he kept his mouth open, because he 
could hear when I met him two years later. Other-
wise, if he had had his mouth closed he would have 
blown out his eardrums. 
We had planned to meet the covering party 
down by the river. They expected to be there a 
while after they heard the bang, not knowing that 
we had used only 30-second fuses, so we met them 
just outside the gate. What astonished us was that 
the Germans did not understand what had hap-
pened at all. The covering party told us that one 
man came out of the doorway of the guard house 
with a torch, and made a sort of search around the 
house and went in again. When we got back across 
the river, we took a parallel road to the main road 
leading down to Rjukan centre. At the place where 
the funicular starts down in the valley, we began 
climbing a zigzag road leading up to the top. It was 
a rise of about six or seven hundred metres, and it 
took us, I would say, three hours from the explo-
sion until we could put on our skis up on the 
mountainside. The alarm went off when we were 
down by the river, and immediately, as we got up 
on the road, the first car came up from Rjukan. 
Later on we saw lots of cars driving towards 
Vemork, because it was only 50 to lOO yards down 
to the main road, so that we could see all the traffic 
going up. Since the guards down on the bridge 
reported that nobody had passed, the Germans 
apparently believed that we had to be on the 
southern side of the valley. Therefore they did not 
do anything on the northern side at all. Remember 
that only three of us had been seen. The Germans 
did not know that there had been nine of us. Later 
on I heard that their main theory was that we had 
come to Vemork as civilians, had put on uniform 
for the operation, dressed in civilian clothes 
afterwards and tried to go by ordinary communica-
tion lines towards Oslo. So that was where they 
started to search. 
Now we know that the Germans never had the 
faintest idea what had really happened, where we 
came from and how we escaped. Luckily we had 
left no tracks because the ground was frozen and 
there was no snow at all. I remember sitting up on 
the mountainside that morning seeing the sunrise 
on the other side with the Gaustadtoppen mountain 
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peak lit in the red morning light - it was a marvel-
lous sight. Of the nine of us, nobody was shot in 
the valley, not even a gun was loaded. It was a 
marvellous situation for the one who had had the 
responsibility ofleading the operation. I remember 
we were sitting there eating biscuits and chocolate, 
and nobody said anything at all. I think everybody 
had quite enough with his own thoughts. 
We then continued down to LangsjA, where we 
had stayed on our way towards Vemork, and here 
we rested. While resting, a stonn blew up, so we 
went to bed and slept for 12 hours, and when we 
woke up the next morning it was still blowing, so 
we just turned our heads to the wall and slept for 
another ten hours. And in this way we managed to 
make a sort of recovery. At midnight the wind 
eased, and we were able to get a bit closer to 
where we had landed. There the Swallow group 
had its headquarters, and again we were pressed to 
stay for another night because of the weather. At 
Skryken, where we had landed, we found our 
equipment, and the five of us who had orders to go 
to Sweden in unifonn started out. The maps we 
had were of a scale of I: 1 00,000 - 1 centimetre to 
the kilometre - and I think we worked out our way 
all right. It was 40 years before satellite navigation, 
but I do not think we strayed from our route more 
than a couple of hundred yards the whole way. 
Eighteen days after we had been pushed away from 
the building by the blast, we crossed the Swedish 
border, and had a good night's sleep in Sweden in 
sleeping bags and unifonn. 
The next morning we more or less undressed, 
and reported to the Swedish guards in white snow 
suits, underwear and a jersey. Our rucksacks were 
empty, because the escape had taken ten days more 
than we had calculated, and we had no food left. 
We said we were refugees. They treated us as such, 
and we were sent to a refugee camp. There we 
applied for three days leave to Stockholm. I 
remember going to the Opera with a friend of 
mine, sitting in one of the best seats listening to La 
Traviata, and digging each other in the ribs to be 
quite certain that we were alive and awake. And so 
we reported to the British Embassy and got all the 
help we needed. We started buying equipment for 
the next operation, and we got pennission to go by 
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the civil post plane to London. When we landed in 
Scotland at the end of March, it was like coming 
home again. We were in a very special situation; 
when we were in Great Britain, we always talked 
about getting back to Norway, getting home, but 
having landed on Norwegian soil, we immediately 
started talking about how long will it be until we 
get home again - and then we were thinking of 
England. And that feeling lasted all the time. It, 
could only be strengthened, of course, by the fact 
that our operation was also a very, very great 
Allied operation: We were trained by the British, 
we were flown by British airplanes, we were taken 
care of by the British the whole way. Moreover, 40 
young British chaps gave their lives on Norwegian 
soil in the battle against the atom bomb. 
Later on there was the bombing in November 
1943, because the production of heavy water was 
started up again, a bit quicker than the British and 
Americans had expected. Finally, there was also 
the sinking of the ferry in February 1944, which 
put an end to Vemork producing heavy water for 
the Gennans. Both the bombing and the sinking of 
the ferry caused loss of civilian lives - unfortu-
nately. As far as our operation is concerned, I am 
quite certain that no other sabotage operation 
carried out in Europe during the war had the 
benefit of such wonderful intelligence. Neverthe-
less, we were extremely lucky we succeeded. 
Everybody engaged on our side - eleven men 
altogether - and also the chaps who were our 
contacts down in the valley, survived the war. And 
of the soldiers taking part, each one spent at least 
twelve months on operation in Norway after they 
had been to Vemork; some of them spent the whole 
time, more or less, between then and 1945 on 
operation, and lived to tell the tale. 
And that is the reason why some of us go out 
and tell the younger generation of our experiences, 
hoping that this is one way of preventing it ever 
happening again. 
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The supplies of Norwegian heavy water to France and 
the early development of atomic energy* 
By Bertrand Goldschmidt 
The fundamental discoveries 
One of the extraordinary aspects of the history of 
the making of the atomic bomb, from the brilliant 
basic scientific discoveries of the 1930s to the 
surprising achievements of the Manhattan project, 
is the fact that the weapon was ready exactly on 
time to abbreviate the most devastating conflict the 
world has ever faced. 
If some of the major events of this history had 
not taken place at the proper moment, the final 
issue could have been delayed, if not drastically 
altered. One of these lesser-known events is the 
loan of the worldwide stock of heavy water by 
NorskHydro to France in 1940. 
It all started in February 1932: by the discovery 
of the neutron by James Chadwick at the 
Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, By a strange 
coincidence, during the same week Harold Urey at 
Columbia University, New York announced the 
discovery of the isotope of mass 2 of hydrogen, 
known as Heavy Hydrogen. In addition to the 
single proton of the nucleus of ordinary hydrogen 
(mass I), which is six thousand times more abun-
dant in nature, its nucleus contains a neutron. 
Then, in early 1934, Irene Curie and Frederic 
Joliot in Paris discovered artificial radioactivity. 
Soon afterwards Enrico Fermi in Rome found that 
the neutron was the ideal particle to penetrate 
inside the nucleus and create new isotopes; more 
easily when it is slowed down by passing through 
materials containing light elements. Soon after-
wards Fermi's team was faced with an enigma: the 
natore of the surprisingly numerous radioisotopes 
formed by bombarding uranium, the heaviest 
. element in natore, with neutrons. It took more than 
four years to solve this problem, by a kind of 
scientific ping-pong which took place between the 
• A paper presented at the International Conference 
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leading radio elements in Rome, Berlin and Paris 
and which culminated in the revolutionary discov-
ery of fission at the end of of 1938. The solution 
was arrived at by Otto Hahn, Fritz Strassmann and 
Lise Meitner of the Kayser Wilhelm Institute in 
Berlin as well as by otto Frisch of the Niels Bohr 
Institute in Copenhagen, after they had been put on 
the right track by Irene Curie and Pavel Savitch in 
Paris. 
A few weeks later Bohr rightly predicted that it 
is the rare isotope of uranium, uranium 235, which 
is fissile by neutrons of all energies, while the 
hundred and thirty-nine times more abundant 
uranium 238 captores neutrons of a given range of 
energy and is transmutedinto isotopes oftransura-
mum elements. 
The secondary neutrons 
The race towards the chain reaction started in 
earnest in March 1939, when Joliot at the College 
de France in Paris and his assistants Hans Halban 
and Lew Kowarski, of Austrian and Russian origin 
respectively, were the first to publish the fact that, 
in addition to the formation of radioactive fISsion 
products and a considerable release of energy, the 
splitting of each uranium atom by a neutron is 
accompanied by the ejection at high speed of new 
neutrons. A week later at Columbia University, the 
Italian Nobel prize winner Enrico Fermi and Leo 
Szilard, a Hungarian physicist, arrived at the same 
conclusion. Szilard had lived many years in 
Germany where he had worked with Einstein. 
Early in April 1939, the French team published 
their estimation that the number of these secondary 
neutrons was about 3.5 per fission, while the 
Italian group found 2 (the exact value is 2.5). Any 
figure superior to I meant that in favourable 
conditions a chain reaction should be obtainable. 
From thereon the Frenchmen's work was shrouded 
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in secrecy. They had reached the conclusion that to 
obtain a chain reaction with natural uranium, it 
should be mixed with a 'moderator'. This is a 
substance made of light elements capable of 
slowing down the secondary neutrons under the 
energy threshold where these particles are captured 
by the uranium 238 atoms, thus increasing their 
chances of creating new fission in uranium 235. 
In the beginning of May, Joliot and his col-
leagues registered three secret patents in the name 
of the "Caisse Nationale de la Recherche 
Scientifique" (KRAUTS) which had substantially 
subsidised their research. The flfSt two patents 
cover all the essentials oftoday's nuclear power 
plants, as they mention the moderator, the cooling 
fluid, the control rods, and the shielding for radia-
tion protection. The third patent dealt with explo-
sive charges, but here the inventors' foresight was 
not so brilliant. 
The Belgian uranium 
Once the patents had been registered, Joliot got in 
touch with the Belgian firm Union Miniere du 
Haut-Katanga Since the 1920s this firm had 
possessed a near monopoly for the production of 
radium from exceptionally rich Congolese uranium 
ore and it owned in Belgium a stockpile of more 
than 1,000 tons of uranium oxide, unused 'wastes' 
of the past radium extraction. On 13 May, 1939 the 
CNRS and Union Miniere initiated a draft agree-
ment, the first international nuclear contract, 
aiming at a joint and exclusive exploitation of the 
first two French basic patents. The outbreak of the 
war prevented this agreement's final ratification, 
but it began with the loan of 8 tons of uranium 
oxide to Jolio!' s team by the Belgian firm for a first 
experiment. So by the summer of 1939, the French 
scientists had access to uranium by the ton which 
none of their competitors had yet obtained. 
At the same time, in July 1939, in New York, 
Szilard and two other Hungarian refugee physicists 
Eugene Wigner and Edward Teller became worried 
about the possibility, that, in case of war, the 
Germans could get hold of the Belgian uranium 
stockpile. Wanting to warn the Belgian govem-
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ment, they asked Einstein to sign a letter to the 
Queen Mother Elizabeth of Belgium, a patron of 
musicians, artists and scientists, with whom he was 
well acquainted, to obtain her help in this matter. 
Reluctant to mix his personal relations with poli-
tics, Einstein agreed instead, on 2 August 1939, to 
sign a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt. This 
letter was only handed to the President .on 11 
October, with a report from Szilard depicting the 
terrible effects of a future atomic bomb smuggled 
in by ship and exploded in a port. Roosevelt took 
immediate action and set up a secret committee on 
uranium, which at its first meeting, ten days later, 
allocated 6,000 dollars to Szilard for his experi-
ments. 
Szilard was right to worry about the Germans 
as they had also entered the race after the French 
had published their estimation 00.5 for the 
number of secondary neutrons by fission. Both 
their Ministry of National Education and the War 
Ministry had been alerted by nuclear physicists at 
the end of April 1939, and when the war started in 
September, Germany was the first and only coun-
try to have a secret military unit exclusively 
devoted to the military applications of uranium 
fission. It was located at Gottow near Berlin in a 
rocket projectiles and explosives establishment. It 
was directed by an able nuclear physicist Kurt 
Diebner, while the theoretical physicist Wemer 
Heisenberg was going to assume the de facto 
leadership of the project. 
The best moderator 
By the end of 1939 the scientists involved in the 
race towards the chain reaction in natural uranium, 
in Germany, France and the United States, had all 
arrived practically at the same stage and had 
reached identical conclusions: the intervention of a 
moderator is indispensable; ordinary water absorbs 
too many neutrons to be usable (one could produce 
uranium enriched in uranium 235); carbon in its 
purest form could, maybe, just work out while 
heavy water offers the best chances of success, 
heavy hydrogen absorbing fewer neutrons than 
ordinary hydrogen or carbon. Heisenberg sent a 
IFS Into 4/95 
report to the War Ministry on these lines, while 
Joliot wrote a memorandum to the Minister of 
Armament Raoul Dautry, who was responsible for 
scientific military research. This memorandum 
specified that "an appropriately constituted mixture 
of heavy hydrogen and uranium presents at the 
current state of knowledge all the conditions 
favourable for the development of a chain reaction 
and consequently for a massive release of energy". 
Suddenly Norsk Hydro, at that time the only 
world producer of heavy water by the kilo, with its 
stockpile of200 kilos, worth then about 120,000 
dollars and its 10 kilos per month production, 
became a major focus of interest for the German 
and French chain reaction competitors. In contrast 
the Columbia University team of Fermi and 
Szilard, still awaiting its first grant of 6,000 dollars 
for the purchase of a few tons of pure graphite, was 
obliged by sheer lack of funds to disregard the 
more promising heavy water line. 
In January 1940, the Germans, through the I.G .. 
Farben cartel, which held shares in Norsk Hydro, 
were the first to contact the Norwegian firm; they 
ordered 25 kilos of heavy water, offered to buy all 
the existing stock and inquired about the feasibility 
and the cost of increasing production tenfold. This 
offer was refused by the Norwegian firm after I.G. 
Farben themselves had avoided answering Norsk 
Hydro's query about the exact nature of the future 
use of these large quantities. 
The Alller mission 
Having learned about the German move, Joliot 
convinced Dautry, his minister, who in turn got the 
agreement ofEdouard Daladier, the Prime Minis-
ter, to dispatch rapidly to Oslo a secret mission to 
try to obtain as much as possible of the precious 
substance. Fortunately, a French bank, the 
"Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas", controlled a 
majority interest in Norsk Hydro. Jacques Allier, 
the executive at the bank who dealt with the 
Norwegian firm, was chosen by Dautry to lead this 
mission with the help of three French secret agents 
due to join him in Stockholm on his way to Oslo. 
His mission order specified in the purest spy novel 
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style without mentioning either Norway or heavy 
water that "Monsieur Jacques Allier is empowered 
by the Prime Minister to negotiate with the party 
holding the material that is the object of his mis-
sion to assure for France the availability of the 
largest quantities thereof". 
A surprise awaited Allier on his arrival in Oslo: 
the general manager ofNorsk Hydro Axel Aubert, 
unjustly suspected of pro-German sympathies by 
the French Embassy, was in fact entirely devoted 
to the Allied cause; when told by Allier that the 
heavy water was needed for defence purposes, he 
decided to lend free of charge the entire stock of 
185.5 kilos to the French government; after the end 
of the war, it would have the choice of either 
purchasing or returning it. He agreed also, if the 
first planned experiments were successful, to 
reserve for France the entire future production 
which could probably be increased, if necessary, 
fivefold or tenfold. 
Allier reacted to this generous offer by describ-
ing openly the secret objectives of Joliot's work to 
Aubert who replied, "Please tell Prime Minister 
Daladier on my behalf that my company does not 
wish to receive one centime for the product you are 
bringing back to him until France is victorious. As 
far as I am concerned, I know that if the experi-
ments of which you have told me succeed and if 
later France has the misfortune of losing the war, I 
will be shot by the Germans for what I am doing 
today. But it is a matter of pride for me to run such 
a risk". Fortunately Aubert did not suffer person-
ally at the hands of the Germans when they occu-
pied Norway and his plant, but he was obliged to 
deliver to them the total increased production of his 
plant. 
The negotiation was concluded on March 9 in 
Oslo by a gentlemen's agreement. It granted the 
Norwegian firm 15 per cent of the profits from any 
technical developments derived primarily from the 
loan of heavy water to France. In Allier's some-
what optimistic opinion, these technical develop-
ments might have led to the production of electric-
ity at a cost even lower than the already very low 
price of the Norwegian hydroelectricity and 
therefore could be prejudicial to the economical 
interests ofNorsk Hydro; hence the contemplated 
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compensation of 15 per cent. (Today there are 
indeed nuclear power stations in the world operat-
ing with heavy water, in particular the Canadian 
ones, whose origin, as we will see, is directly 
linked to the 185 kilo loan to France, but the price 
of their electricity production, although economi-
cally acceptable, is still well above the price 
Norway can get from water power!) 
After making reservations several days running 
on the flights from Oslo to Holland and from Oslo 
to Scotland, and pretending to load the heavy water 
containers on the Amsterdam flight (which was 
forced by German fighters to land in Hamburg and 
searched in vain), Allier and one of the secret 
agents left for Scotland with ten of the 26 cans 
which had been hastily fabricated in Oslo and 
filled in Rjnkan. The 16 other cans followed by the 
same route two days later accompanied by the 
other two agents. 
When the mission had been organized in 
February 1940, the French secret service were 
uneasy over the fact that Joliot's principal as-
sistants Hans von Halban and Lew Kowarski, 
recently natura1ised French, both came from 
countries now hostile or unfriendly to France. To 
assure that they would not be suspected in case of a 
breach of secrecy, Joliot asked them to agree to 
stay in a guarded residence during Allier's mission. 
They consented and chose respectively, the islands 
ofPorquerolles in the Mediterranean and Belle-He 
in the Atlantic. On March 18, three weeks before 
the invasion of Norway by the Germans, the heavy 
water arrived safely at the College de France, while 
Halban and Kowarski returned to their laboratory. 
After having been "security risks" they were again 
indispensable scientists. 
The crucial experiment 
The following two months were devoted to setting 
up the decisive experiment, but it was still not 
ready when the German army started to invade 
France. When all hope was lost, Dautry decided to 
send the stock of 8 tons of borrowed Belgian 
uranium oxide to Morocco where it stayed hidden 
in an unused gallery of a phosphate mine until the 
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end of the war. He also ordered Joliot, Halban and 
Kowarski to leave for England with the heavy 
water. 
Joliot, however, decided not to abandon his 
laboratory where the first cyclotron in Western 
Europe was under construction. Meanwhile in June 
1940, Halban, Kowarski and the 26 cans of heavy 
water boarded a ship with a cargo of coal, com-
mandeered by Lord Suffolk, the British scientific 
representative to the French Ministry of Arma-
ment, who had decided to bring out of France any 
person, equipment or material capable of helping 
Britain in the pursuit of the war. Their mission 
order specified ''They are required to continue in 
England, in absolute secrecy, the research begun at 
the College de France". So after being under a sort 
of house arrest for a few months, Halban and 
Kowarski found themselves assigned the grave 
responsibility of trying to keep France in the 
atomic race, and for this purpose their 185 kilos of 
heavy water was their best and most invaluable 
asset. 
Halban and Kowarski were very well received 
in England by their scientific colleagnes responsi-
ble for defence research. The British were all the 
more interested because they had so far concen-
trated their attention on the chain reaction by fast 
neutrons in pure uranium 235, on the methods of 
separating this isotope, and on an uranium 235 
bomb, but had given little thought to the controlled 
chain reaction by slow neutrons in natural uranium. 
The coordinating British committee on uranium 
research, code-named the Maud Committee, 
therefore invited the two French scientists to stay 
in Britain and pursue their research at the 
Cavendish Laboratory. In mid-December 1940 
they successfully performed the crucial experiment 
planned in Paris, demonstrating for the first time 
that it would be possible to produce atomic energy 
with natural uranium. 
The report of the Maud Committee 
The conclusions of the Maud Committee were 
finalised in an official report in July 1941. One part 
dealt with the uranium 235 bomb and the other 
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with the production of energy and was almost 
entirely devoted to the consequences of the work 
of the two French scientists. It stated:. "Their 
results showed a definite indication of a divergent 
process; for each initial neutron 1.06 ± 0.02 were 
produced in one set of experiments, 1.05 + 0.015 in 
another. The system used was very small owing to 
the fact that the amount of heavy water at their 
disposal was only 180 kilos and a large loss of 
neutrons from the surface prevented a divergent 
chain from developing. They estimated that the 
critical size of the system which would liberate 
large amounts of energy would require 3 to 6 tons 
of water". 
It was only in May 1942, nearly a year and a 
half after their French competitors, that Heisenberg 
and Dopel made a similar experiment in Leipzig 
with 140 kilos of Norwegian heavy water and 
arrived at the same conclusion that a diverging 
chain reaction would be feasible, estimating also 
that about 5 tons of moderator would be needed for 
criticality. During that same spring of 1942 Fermi 
and Szilard, now working at Chicago University 
where all the chain reaction work was to be coordi-
nated, were at last practically certain that with pure 
enough graphite and uranium oxide or metal, the 
chain reaction would be achieved. 
A year before at the University of California at 
Berkeley, a young American chemist Glenn 
Seaborg, utilizing the large cyclotron, had found in 
May 1941 that uranium 238 was transmuted by 
neutron capture to form a long-lived isotope of· 
element 94 that he isolated and named plutonium; 
he also found that this plutonium 239 had better 
fissile properties than uranium 235 and could 
therefore be used for a fast neutron bomb. 
The Maud Committee, informed of this discov-
ery, underlined that this isotope of element 94 
would be produced in a "machine of Halban Type" 
which could thus be used for military purposes. 
The report concluded that "Drs Halban and 
Kowarski have done all they can with the supplies 
which they brought into this country" and sug-
gested that ''they should be allowed to work in the 
USA" where steps were being taken to produce 
heavy water on a large scale. 
It is an undisputed fact that the conclusions of 
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the Maud report which were known in the appro-
priate high spheres in Washington at the end of the 
summer of 1941 were an important factor in the 
decision of President Roosevelt in October 1941 to 
give the highest priority to the pursuit of the 
research work on uranium, a decision which can be 
considered as the starting point of the American 
enterprise. Therefore it can be construed that the 
loan of the 185 kilos Norwegian heavy water to 
France had a definite influence on such a develop-
ment, even though none of the plutonium for 
military purposes produced during the war origi-
nated from heavy water piles, as all of this nuclear 
explosive came from graphite moderated units. But 
in October 1941 heavy water was the only proven 
moderator for the obtention of the chain reaction 
with natural uranium, while the use of graphite for 
such a purpose was still in doubt. 
Paradoxically while these 185 kilos had con-
tributed to influence the major decision taken in 
Washington through the result of the Cambridge 
experiment, this result had considerably reduced 
their own value as an asset in the hands of 
Halban's team as it was now clear that they only 
represented a twenty-fifth of the amount needed to 
start up a chain reaction. Hence, the heavy water 
asset was passing now to the Americans who 
would produce it by the ton from the end of 1943 
on. 
The Anglo-Canadian project 
Halban's weak position became clear when, in the 
beginning of 1942, he was sent on a mission to the 
States as the head of the chain reaction branch of 
Tube Alloys (the code name of the British project). 
All the doors were open to him, in particular at 
Chicago where, under the code name of the Metal-
lurgical Laboratory, all the graphite-uranium and 
plutonium work had been concentrated. But the 
suggestion that Halban and his team of ten scien-
tists of French, British and German nationalities 
should settle in Chicago as an independent British 
unit met an absolute veto from Washington, in 
particular because of the opposition of the FBI 
regarding the employment of foreigners on Ameri-
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can defence projects. 
Finally Churchill agreed during the summer of 
1942, with the approval of Washington, that 
Halban's team should be transferred to Canada as 
the initial nucleus of a much larger Anglo-Cana-
dian group devoted to the development up to the 
industrial stage of the natural uranium-heavy water 
system. It was also tacitly understood that this 
enterprise, the first scientific multinational project 
ever created, would profit from the proximity of 
Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, and be the 
beneficiary of the first tons of heavy water pro-
duced in North America. 
This was not to be. In late December 1942, 
three weeks after the successful start on 2 Decem-
ber of the Fermi zero-power graphite pile in 
Chicago, Roosevelt decided to limit any exchange 
of nuclear information with the British and Cana-
dian partoers to basic science only. The President 
had been briefed by his scientific advisers both on 
the considerable lead which the Americans had 
taken during the past year over the British, whose 
help was much less needed now, as well as on the 
power his country would gain by being the sole 
holder of the new weapon. 
The presidential decision was the first manifes-
tation of the non-proliferation policy which today 
plays such an important role on the world scene, 
and was the start of a nine months' breakdown of 
exchanges. This was a terrible blow for the Anglo-
Canadian team, which was ready to start work in 
an adequately equipped laboratory in Montreal and 
instead was condemned to demoralising inaction 
during the whole year 1943. 
Naturally Churchill reacted vigorously and 
insisted at each of his three summit meetings with 
Roosevelt in 1943 that such an unfair decision was 
totally contrary to the spirit of the Alliance. Fi-
nally, at the Quebec Conference in August 1943, 
the President gave in and accepted a resumption of 
the nuclear collaboration though strictly limited to 
the pursuit of the war. The "Quebec Agreement" 
sealed the reconciliation by which the three part-
ners adopted a joint policy of secrecy and decided 
to purchase and share all the uranium available in 
the world. It was, however, too late for the first 
objective of the Montreal laboratory and the 
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fulfilment ofHalban's hopes, as the Americans had 
. alloted their initial tons of heavy water to Fermi's 
team for the building of the first heavy water pile 
in the world. It was built at Argonne near Chicago 
where it went critical in May 1944 and ran later at 
low power. 
Fortunately, in March 1944, the Americans, 
who felt that the postwar applications of the heavy 
water piles could be important, decided to make 
use of the Anglo-Canadian group and embarked on 
a joint tripartite project of a 10,000 kilowatts heavy 
water pile, to be built in Canada with American-
supplied uranium metal rods and heavy water. 
This pile was achieved in 1947 at Chalk River, 
Ontario. A smaller unit of zero power was planned 
as a frrst step and its construction was entrusted to 
Kowarski's leadership. Justice had been done: one 
of the members of the French nuclear tandem who 
had brought the Norwegian heavy water to Eng-
land in 1940 was responsible for the building of the 
frrst atomic pile outside the USA. It diverged at 
Chalk River, in September 1945. This was the start 
of Canada's postwar atomic effort as well as of its 
present world leadership in the field of heavy water 
natural uranium power reactors following a chain 
of events which began with the Norsk Hydro loan 
to France in 1940. 
Informing de Gaulle 
Because of the special secret nature of their mis-
sions, Halban and Kowarski had not revealed their 
participation in the Allied atomic effort to the Free . 
French organisation. Furthermore, neither General 
de Gaulle nor any leader of the United Nations had 
ever been informed of the development of the new 
weapon by the signatories of the Quebec Agree-
ment who had committed themselves toa joint 
policy of secrecy towards any third party. 
However, the Montreal project had among its 
leaders three other Frenchmen Pierre Auger, 
Bertrand Goldschmidt and Jules Gueron, who had 
double allegiance as all three had been seconded to 
the British by the Free French Forces. Conscious of 
the tremendous potentialities of the future bomb, 
and worried by the monopolistic tendencies of the 
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Americans from which they had suffered in 1943, 
they felt de Gaulle should be informed even if it 
meant breaching their British pledge of secrecy. 
Taking advantage of a short visit of the French 
president in Ottawa in July 1944 during the early 
days of the liberation of his country, they informed 
him briefly and in utmost secrecy of this new 
element of world politics; this element was ex-
pected, hopefully, to end the war one year later and 
would considerably influence the postwar equilib-
rium. They also insisted on the necessity of 
relaunching atomic research in France as soon as 
possible. 
At the end of 1944, Joliot and Dautry, the two 
leaders of the early French enterprise of 1940, also 
alerted the President of the provisional government 
of the urgency of renewing atomic research. After 
the Liberation, they were again put in a position of 
authority, Joliot as director of the CNRS and 
Dautry as Minister of Reconstruction and Urban 
Affairs. So when, in March 1945, Dautry sug-
gested to de Gaulle to reopen the negotiations on 
the supply of Norwegian heavy water, he received 
approval immediately and decided to send the 
indispensable "Monsieur Allier" on a mission to 
London to meet officials of the provisional Norwe-
gian government in exile. 
Reactivation of the 1940 agreement 
with Norsk Hydro 
Allier had kept hidden during the occupation a 
photo of the agreement he had signed with Aubert 
in March 1940 as the French original copy (as well 
as the Norwegian one) had been purposely de-
stroyed before the arrival of the Germans. It stated 
that Norsk Hydro would reserve for France its total 
heavy water production for a period to be fixed by 
the French side. 
Allier first verified that neither Norsk Hydro, 
nor the Norwegian government in London, had 
committed any of its postwar production to anyone 
of the United Nations, not even the USA and the 
UK whose governments had been adamant about 
the vital necessity for the Alliance to prevent heavy 
water getting into the hands of the Germans. Allier 
IFS Inlo 4/95 
then told the Norwegian officials that France was 
about to resume its atomic research and so would 
be in a position to help Norway in future negotia-
tions with third parties, in particular Great Britain. 
He also told them that, in the application of the 
1940 agreement with Norsk Hydro, his government 
had decided to fix the period of its ~xclusive 
purchasing rights to ten years after the war, as it 
considered that this agreement mentioned "the 
duration of the hostilities" only as an example. 
The Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold was 
naturally reluctant to commit either Norsk Hydro 
or the first Norwegian government after the libera-
tion. He, however, accepted an exchange ofletters 
between Allier and himself in which he took notice 
of the French request without objecting to it and in 
which he looked forward to the resumption and 
development of the collaboration initiated in 1940. 
This exchange ofletters in April 1945 somewhat 
reactivated and officialised the March 1940 agree-
ment at a time when the French were in no position 
to specify with precision the amount of heavy 
water they might need. 
Because of the new situation created by the use 
of the bomb against Japan on 6 August 1945 and 
the French government's desire to finalise the 
negotiations as soon as possible, Allier was once 
again sent on a mission. He met Bjame Eriksen, 
the general manager ofNorsk Hydro, and Foreign 
Minister Trygve Lie in Oslo at the end of August. 
The latter also found the ten years' excIusivism 
requested by the French in April much too ambi-
tious, but agreed in September, as a compromise, 
to the sale to France of 5 tons, the minimum 
quantity requested by French authorities and 
probably enough for a first pile. It was further 
understood that this sale should not contravene any 
future international law on the control of atomic 
energy. 
Two months later, in November 1945, the three 
atomic war partners, the USA, the UK, and 
Canada, held a summit meeting in Washington 
devoted entirely to atomic matters. Until an effec-
tive international control regime was established, 
they decided to pursue the policy which they had 
adopted in Quebec in 1943. This was the policy of 
secrecy and of jointly purchasing all the uranium 
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available in the Western world. Following this the 
Americans and the British had concluded an 
agreement with the Belgian government in exile in 
1944 giving them a first option on all uranium 
coming out of Belgian Congo for ten years. 
In the years following the war this agreement 
deprived many countries of the two indispensable 
ingredients for any atomic programme: know-how 
and uranium, and therefore it can be considered as 
the first comprehensive policy of non-proliferation. 
Fortunately the three partners did not extend it to 
heavy water (of which they now had a sufficient 
production in North America) by trying to pur-
chase in advance the Norwegian output, the only 
other source in the Western world. 
Thus France, Norway jointly with Holland, and 
Sweden were able to put to use the few tons of 
uranium they possessed or could produce, and start 
up respectively in 1948, 1951, and 1954, their first 
low power heavy water piles thanks to their access 
to Norsk Hydro's production. Should that access 
have been barred to France and Sweden, these two 
countries would have lost a few years in their 
nuclear development corresponding to the time 
required to obtain from their own uranium deposits 
the nearly ten times greater amount of uranium 
needed for a Fermi type of graphite pile. 
The French postwar purchases from 
NorskHydro 
In March 1946 the French paid back Norsk Hydro 
the amount of 280,000 Norwegian Crowns 
(NOK), the cost at a price of 1.5 NOK per gram of 
the precious initial 1940 loan of 185.5 kilos. Then 
the following week, as agreed six months earlier 
between Lie and Allier, a first contract for 5 tons 
of heavy water was concluded between Norsk 
Hydro and the French Commissariat a l'Energie 
Atomique (CEA), established in October 1945 
under the joint leadership of Joliot and Dautry. 
The quantity involved in this contract was later 
extended to 7 tons following the agreement of the 
Norwegian government. The price was 1.35 NOK 
per gram and the delivery was completed by 
September 1948, on time for the start of the first 
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French pile three months later. It was to be a zero 
power uranium oxide unit fuelled with about one 
half of the 8 tons loaned by the Belgians in 1939 
and hidden in Morocco during the occupation of 
France. Its design was based on the know-how 
brought back from Canada by the French members 
of the Montreal project. 
The next two contracts between the CEA and 
Norsk Hydro were concluded in 1950 and 1954 
for respectively 4 and 10 tons. These two contracts 
as well as the following ones had to have the 
agreement of the head of the Norwegian Institute 
for Atomic Energy, Gunnar Randers, with whom 
the CEA had maintained close personal relations 
from the outset. In 1950, this dynamic physicist 
had initiated the Dutch-Norwegian nuclear alli-
ance. As thanks he had received from Holland, 
from a hidden stock purchased by a Professor of 
the University ofLeyden before the war, the 
totality of the uranium needed for the nearly 
completed Kjeller pile. 
The 1950 contract with the CEA was contin-
gent upon the delivery by priority of 4 tons of 
French nuclear pure graphite for the reflector of 
this pile. It also specified that Norway should be 
informed of the location and the use of its heavy 
water. In this case it was intended for the second 
French pile, a 2,000 kilowatt thermal unit which 
diverged in 1952. This pile was metal fuelled and 
carbon dioxide cooled (the cooling system used 
later in all the natural uranium-graphite first 
French power stations). The 1954 contract had an 
additional clause indexing the price of the heavy 
water to the rate of the Norwegian crown versus 
the American dollar and it corresponded to a price 
of95 dollars per pound of heavy water. 
The following year, in the application of the 
Eisenhower «Atoms for Peace» programme, the 
USA decided to sell heavy water for research 
reactors to friendly countries at a price of 28 
dollars per pound, one third of the 1954 Norwegian 
price. Paradoxically the first American sale, of 10 
tons, went to India for the Canadian-built reactor 
which was later to produce the plutonium for the 
1974 Indian atomic explosion. 
The CEA was also among the first countries to 
profit by the American offer by purchasing 30 tons 
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in mid-1955 for delivery between 1956 and 1958. 
It was intended for tbe tbird French pile, a high 
flux material testing unit which diverged in 1957. 
Similarly tbe second Norwegian reactor built at 
Halden and started up in 1959 was moderated by 
cheap American heavy water, tbe expensive Norsk 
Hydro production being reserved for exportation. 
Indeed, in 1955, France had decided to embark 
on tbe project of a nuclear submarine propelled by 
a natura1 uranium heavy water engine for which 
tbe Norwegian high-priced material was the only 
source. Thus tbe CEA concluded in June 1956 a 
fourtb contract, tbis time at tbe price of 1 NOK per 
gram which corresponded to 64 dollars per pound, 
still nearly two and a half times tbe American 
price. Norsk Hydro could not have lacked clients at 
tbis high price as tbe delivery of tbese last 10 tons 
could not be promised before tbe end of 1958, even 
tbough its yearly production had reached tbe level 
of25 tons. 
This contract specified that tbe heavy water was 
to be used by tbe CEA which was not allowed to 
sell it to a non-French purchaser witbout tbe 
agreement ofNorsk Hydro. The Norwegian firm, 
on tbe otber hand, could not refuse such re-export 
witbout valid reasons,. and would also have to buy 
tbe heavy water back at an' agreed, price,. 
WIlen tbe natural uranium submarine· engine 
project turned out to be a white elephant in March 
1958 tbe' CEA asked Norsk Hydro to cancel tbis 
last contract for which no delivery had yet taken 
place. Norsk Hydro refused but had to accept tbe 
fact tbat tbe CEA could resell tbe 10 tons of heavy 
waterto any country except tbose covered by tbe 
COCOM and CHINCOM regulations. 
Finally in 1962, Norsk Hydro, which had 
probably amortised its heavy water installations, 
decided to adopt tbe same price as tbe USA for its 
sales: i.e. 28 dollars per pound. 
At that time tbe CEA was involved in building 
four large heavy water moderated reactors due to 
diverge in tbe second half of tbe decade and 
needing a total amount oftbe order of250 tons: tbe 
only heavy water nuclear power plant ever built in 
France, an 80 MWe unit to be erected in Britanny, 
a high neutron flux reactor for a joint Franco-
German Research Institute in Grenoble and two 
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tritium producing units for tbermonuclear weapons 
located in tbe soutb oftbe country. Simultaneously 
tbe first national heavy water producing plant was 
being constructed. It was based on tbe water-
ammonia exchange process and planned for a 
production of tbe same order of maguitude as tbe 
Rjukan plant. These important requirements were 
tben fulfilled by purchases from France, tbe USA 
and Norway, following, in tbis last case, a final 
large contract of75 tons which Norsk Hydro 
delivered from 1962 to 1970. 
Thus tbe total deliveries from Norsk Hydro to 
France since tbe war amounted to about 100 tons. 
During tbose years tbe French exports in tbe heavy 
water related nuclear field were limited to tbe 1956 
decision to build in Israel at Dimona a large heavy 
water natural uranium reactor, similar to tbe one 
Canada had offered tbe year before to India for 
construction near Bombay. It was only in 1971 tbat 
India ordered two heavy water production facilities 
from French industry. 
Out oftbe 100 tons of Norwegian heavy water 
delivered from 1940 to 1970 to France, tbe first 
two amounts of respectively 185 kilos and 7 tons 
were of vital importance for French atomic devel-
opment. This holcLs true even tbough tbe later 
nuclear industrialisation of the country, decided by 
a first five year plan adopted in 1952 by tbe 
Parliament, followed tbe graphite moderated line 
and' not tbe heavy water moderated one. 
The 185 kilos were tbe entrance ticket to tbe tbe 
Allied nuclear enterprise and tbe obtention of tbe 
heavy water reactor and plutonium extraction 
. know-how, while tbe 7 tons oftbe late 1940s were 
indispensable for tbe French access to tbe tben 
prestigious and limited club of tbe nations owning 
nuclear reactors. 
It is impossible to rewrite history and in tbis 
case to describe what French nuclear development 
would have been witbout tbese early deliveries. 
The CEA would have taken at least tbree more 
years to construct its first pile, which would have 
been a graphite unit fuelled from metropolitan 
uranium ore discovered only in late 1948, and 
tberefore tbe first five year nuclear industrialisation 
plan would have been delayed by as many years. 
Who knows whetber, in tbe mid-fifties, a less 
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advanced and weaker CEA would still have gained 
its battle for a nuclear weapons programme that it 
won against the partisans of the European integra-
tion, who were opposed to such a programme 
because it was discriminatory to West Germany? 
In any case one can conclude that these Norwegian 
sales to France had a considerable influence on its 
nuclear destiny. 
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